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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of minimum wage on employment rates taking
into account potential nonlinearity. Focusing on three age groups, we find a significant nonlin-
ear relationship between the minimum wage and employment for the young (15-24 years) and
older working-age (55-64 years) groups, whereas for the prime-age workers (25-54 years) the
minimum wage does not have a significant non-linear effect. Negative effect of the minimum
wages on employment is stronger if the labor markets are otherwise strictly regulated and
when workers are relatively unproductive.
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1 Introduction
Currently, about 90 percent of countries worldwide have statutory minimum wages in place (see
Herr and Kazandziska, 2011). As such, the effects of minimum wages on employment are not only
theoretically but also empirically one of the most vividly discussed topics in today’s labor market
policies.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effects of changes in the minimum wage on the
employment rate of different age groups in a selection of European countries. We estimate the
effects on the employment rates of young workers aged 15 to 24 years, but also for prime working
age group (25 to 54 years) and for older workers (55 to 64 years). Moreover, recent theoretical
research on the effects of minimum wages on employment suggests that the effect might in fact
be non-linear. In this work, we make a first attempt to test this theoretical prediction in a
cross–country set–up.
Theoretical research by Brown, Merkl, and Snower (2014) serves as a baseline model for our
predictions. The authors show that higher wages depress the “job offer rate.” On the other hand,
higher wages increase the “job acceptance rate,” since the value of work relative to unemployment
increases. Therefore the authors argue: “Under moderate minimum wages, the latter effect may
dominate the former.” It is exactly this possibility of a nonlinear relationship that we are interested
in.
Keeping this theoretical approach in mind, we estimate whether the employment effects of an
increase in the minimum wage might in fact be nonlinear: lower wages could stimulate employment,
whereas once the wage is set too high the effect is reversed. Anticipating the main results, we
show that low minimum wages might induce employment for young and older workers, yet once
the minimum wages are set at higher levels, the employment possibilities are indeed reduced.
Micro-data analysis of the effects of minimum wages on employment is vast. Neumark and
Wascher (2006) give a broad overview of minimum wage studies which estimate the employment
effects. However, even though a number of studies focus on cross-country time-series analysis of
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the employment effects of different labor market policies, there are comparatively few works that
focus on the effect of minimum wage.
The OECD (1998) analyzes minimum wage effects on employment of three specific groups:
teenagers, young adults, and prime-age adults. The authors use a panel of nine OECD countries
between 1975 and 1996. The regression model follows the state-panel models used in the US
minimum wage literature (see e.g. Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg, 2000; Keil, Robertson,
and Symons, 2001; Partridge and Partridge, 1999). The results show that an increase in the
minimum wage has a negative employment effect for the teenager group in all specified models.
For the other age groups the effects are ambiguous.
Another study comes from Neumark and Wascher (2004) and combines the methodology of
the OECD study with some additional data on different labor market institutions and policies
that might influence the employment rates and a panel that includes 17 countries from 1976 until
2000. For all specifications the results for teenagers as well as for the youth suggest a negative
employment effect of an increase in the minimum wage. Additionally, Neumark and Wascher
(2004) estimate the effects of bargaining and subminima for young employees. While bargained
minimum wages and youth subminima lead to a weaker negative employment effect of a minimum
wage increase for teenagers and youths, industry and geographic wage floors seem to strengthen
the negative effects.
Addison and Ozturk (2010) use a panel of 16 OECD countries and look at the period between
1970 and 2008. They estimate the employment effects of a minimum wage increase not on teenagers
and young adults but on female prime-age workers. The results are in line with the findings of
Neumark and Wascher (2004), suggesting a negative employment effect on prime-age females.
Regarding the stronger dis-employment effects in countries with the least regulated labor markets,
they did not find empirical evidence for the target group.
Dolton and Bondibene (2011) re-estimate the results of Neumark and Wascher (2004) by using
panel data for 33 OECD countries from 1976 to 2008. The model they use is similar to the
model of Neumark and Wascher (2004) except for additional controlling for the aggregated labor
market situation. Their results are in line with the findings of Neumark and Wascher (2004),
suggesting a negative employment effect of changes in the minimum wage. As a robustness test,
the authors suggest using a weighted regression technique, to control for different sizes of the
countries’ labor markets. When the authors used this estimation technique, they found neither a
significant negative nor a significant positive employment effect of a minimum wage increase.
While most empirical research was based on a linear employment effect of a minimum wage
increase within countries that might differ in institutional labor market settings and for the low-
skilled and/or young workers, our analysis contributes to the discussion in several ways. Firstly,
we estimate and compare the employment effects of a minimum wage increase of three different age
groups: youth, prime-age workers, and older workers. Secondly, we directly estimate whether the
theoretically-predicted nonlinear effects of minimum wages find evidence for the case of European
countries. Explicit analysis of a nonlinear relationship can explain some of the insignificant results
present in the previous works. Finally, we carefully approach and correct for potential endogeneity
of the covariates, which in many studies has not been accounted for.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we briefly present the theoretical model and
hypotheses for the empirical study. Section 3 presents the empirical model as well as the data.
Afterwards, the empirical findings and robustness analysis will be discussed in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
Before we formulate our hypotheses, it is useful to explain in more detail the hypotheses stemming
from the theoretical work of Brown et al. (2014). In this model, firms only offer a job if the
idiosyncratic variations in workers’ suitability for the jobs are sufficiently low. As a result, since
the job offer rate in the steady state negatively depends on the equilibrium wage, an increase in
the minimum wage will reduce the “job offer rate” and lead to lower employment. This effect is
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called the “job offer effect” and can be summarized by the formula
η = Jε
(
a− w
1− δ(1− σ) − h
)
, (1)
where Jε denotes the cumulative distribution of the job suitability shock, a is the average workers’
productivity, w is the equilibrium wage, δ is the time discount factor, h are the hiring costs, and
σ is the separation rate. It is easy to see that the job offer effect should positively depend on the
average workers’ productivity, and negatively on the wage level as well as hiring costs.
On the other hand, some workers are willing to work for the new (higher) equilibrium wage
because it is now above their reservation wages - the job acceptance rate increases. This leads to
higher employment and is called the “job acceptance effect” and is given by
α = Je
(
w − b
1− δ(1− σ − µ)
)
, (2)
where Je is the cumulative distribution of the work effort disutility shock and b stands for the
unemployment benefit level. Job acceptance clearly positively depends on the wage level and
negatively on the level of unemployment benefits b.
The theoretical predictions of Brown et al. (2014) allow us to formulate hypotheses on the signs
of the effects of particular labor market institutions on employment. As the job acceptance effect
might dominate the job offer effect for lower wages, and the opposite might be true for the case
of high minimum wages, we expect the relationship between the level of the minimum wage and
the employment rates to have an inverted–U shape. Additional inspection of (1) and (2) allows us
to form hypotheses on the signs of the other labor market characteristics on employment as well
as on the interactions between the hiring costs, unemployment benefits, and productivity of the
workers and the minimum wage. We expect the hiring costs as well as the unemployment benefits
to decrease the overall employment levels, whereas the productivity of the workers is expected to
increase employment.
Additionally, the hiring costs, unemployment benefits, and the average productivity change the
strength of the two countervailing effects. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the average productivity
of the workers strengthens the job offer effect and, subsequently, the point at which the minimum
wage effect turns negative should shift to the right. Similarly, both the hiring costs (which reduce
the job offers) and the unemployment benefits (which reduce the job acceptance) should shift
the turning point to the left, towards lower minimum wages. The summary of the predictions is
presented in Table 1.
3 Data and the empirical model
3.1 Data
Our panel contains data on 14 EU countries with statutory minimum wages1 over the period 1980-
2011. The Kaitz index (MWAW ) is used as an index of the minimum wage, and it reflects the
relationship between the level of the minimum wage and the average wage and can be interpreted
as the relative price of low–skilled and average-skilled labor. We do not include the countries with
strict collective bargaining systems for different economic sectors (Italy or Austria) as for these
the Kaitz index is not available and might additionally bias the estimates. The summary statistics
of the Kaitz index are presented in Table 6 in the Appendix.
The main source of the data is the OECD database. The labor force data, including average
worker productivity and replacement rates, were taken from the OECD Annual Labour Force
Statistic, while the Kaitz index is taken from the OECD Minimum Wage Database. Labor market
regulation data come from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) database by the Fraser
1The countries covered in our sample are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom.
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Institute (Gwartney, Lawson, and Norton, 2014), and macroeconomic indicators are taken from
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. Our sample is an unbalanced panel including
228 observations. The source for the unbalanced panel arises from different implementation times
of the statutory minimum wage and only partially from the availability of the data. Hence, this
selectivity should not bias the estimates.2
We study the effect of the minimum wage on employment rates, Emp. We distinguish between
three different age groups: young (aged between 15 and 24 years, EmpY ), prime–aged (aged
between 25 and 54 years, EmpM), and older (aged between 55 and 64 years, EmpO).
Other variables used in the regressions are summarized in Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix.
Additionally, the changes in the Kaitz index in all countries over time can be seen in Figures 7
and 8 in the Appendix.
2The start of our time series for the Kaitz index is highlighted in Table 6.
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3.2 The empirical model
The theoretical predictions suggest that the relationship between the minimum wage level and the
employment rates should have an inverted–U shape. The baseline model is, therefore
Empi,t = α+ β ∗MWAWi,t−1 + γ ∗MWAW 2i,t−1 + δ ∗Hi,t + ζ ∗AWPi,t+
η ∗GRRi,t + Θ ∗Xi,t + τt + αi + εi,t, (3)
where Empi,t is the employment rate at time t in country i, and MWAWi,t−1 is the lagged
minimum wage variable at time t−1 in country i. Hi,t stands for the hiring costs measured by the
strictness of labor market regulations (EFW 5B index)3, AWP is the average labor productivity
measured as GDP per hour worked in country i at time t (at constant prices), GRR is the gross
replacement rate measuring the relative size of the unemployment benefits to the wage levels, and
X is a vector of the control variables. Ui,t is the control variable for the overall labor market
situation, namely the unemployment rate at time t for country i, PRi,t is the size of the respective
cohort: young (aged between 15 and 24 years, PRY ), middle (aged between 25 and 54 years,
PRM), and old (aged between 55 and 64 years, PRO). Additionally we control for the strength
of collective wage bargaining and the strength of conscription regulations (which is particularly
relevant for the young cohort). Finally, τt stands for the time effects and αi are country-specific
fixed effects.
The effects of a minimum wage, from a theoretical perspective, should take place after a delay,
since it takes time for employers to adjust the factor inputs (low-skilled labor, high-skilled labor,
and capital) to a change in the factor prices (see Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger, 1999; Neumark and
Wascher, 1992). Additionally, the high level of employment protection in Europe would suggest to
use the lag the minimum wage variable, since as argued by Neumark and Wascher (2004): “One
might think that this adjustment process would be even slower in European countries, where legal
restrictions on dismissals are generally stricter then in the United States.” The lagged specification
additionally resolves to some extent the problem of potential endogeneity of the MWAW variable,
which will be addressed in full further on.
In order to further explore the size and strength of the effect of minimum wages on employment,
we additionally add interaction terms with the three other main variables, which as explained in
the previous section determine the job offer and job acceptance effects: the average productivity
of workers, hiring costs, and the size of unemployment benefits. We then analyze the signs and
the strength of the marginal effects of the minimum wages for different levels of other variables of
interest.
One of the concerns in our specification is that the unemployment and employment rates
for specific age groups are jointly determined by unobserved factors which determine the overall
macroeconomic condition of a country. To avoid endogeneity bias stemming from this fact, we
do not include the unemployment rate directly, but instrument it in the first stage regressions
with other macroeconomic indicators. On a basis of strong and significant correlations we use
the second lag of the output gap as well as lags of the unemployment rate itself. Additionally,
we reassess all results instrumenting for the unemployment rate with oil shock exposure in the
previous period, as suggested by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), who find that fluctuations
in oil prices have strong effects on employment rates. Exposure to the oil shock is measured as
a lagged difference between the Brent crude import oil prices for each country, i.e. for period t
this variable is defined as pricet−1 − pricet−2. Correlations between the unemployment rate, the
output gap, and the exposure variable are presented in Table 2. We can observe that oil shock
exposure is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate and positively with the output gap.
This instrument might be a weaker measure of macroeconomic conditions, nevertheless its biggest
advantange is a high degree of exogeneity. In all IV regressions, we use the Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood estimator (LIML), which performs better when the instruments are weak4.
3We have rescaled the index so that higher value denotes more regulation.
4The preference for the LIML estimator stems from two main reasons:
1. The LIML estimator has been shown to perform better if the sample size is small, as is ours (see e.g.
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As mentioned above, one of the main concerns in any analysis of the impact of the minimum
wages on the employment levels is potential endogeneity of the main independent variable: min-
imum wage itself might be endogenous with respect to the employment levels, as labor market
policies might be introduced specifically to answer the changes in the labor market conditions. As
argued by Lemos (2005), politicians might favor or oppose minimum wage increases depending on
the overall macroeconomic performance in a country. Yet, irrespective of the reaction of the politi-
cians to the macroeconomic circumstances, changes in the minimum wages can be explained by
the ideology of the politicians in power. Arguably, higher minimum wages are introduced by left–
wing governments irrespective of the economic condition of a country. We base our identification
strategy on this latter observation (see e.g. Saint-Paul, 1996).
In the second set of regressions, we make use of the above observation, and instrument the
minimum wage with the political orientation of the government. Data on the political orientation of
cabinets are provided by the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2012) and include
information on relative power position of social democratic and other left parties in government
based on their seat share in parliament, measured as a percentage of the total parliamentary seat
share of all governing parties and weighted by the number of days in office in a given year. This
instrument will be a valid exogenous source of variation provided that the left–wing politicians
are not elected more often under deteriorating economic conditions. There is some evidence
(Whitten and Palmer, 1999) that the voters punish left–wing governments for rising comparative
unemployment (comparative to the average for industrial democracies), but there is no evidence
on a similar relationship within a country. If left–wing governments are less popular in times of
high unemployment, rising unemployment might reduce the power of the left–wing parties and
in turn result in a lower probability of an increase in a minimum wage. Inclusion of the control
for the general macroeconomic performace should, however, capture this effect, and the residual
variation would in this case be exogenous. Correlations and signifance levels of all instruments are
presented in the Appendix.
Another methodological issue is that the used data is an average of specific data. This might
lead to problems in the estimation methods (see e.g. Baker et al. (1999)) because the size of
the labor markets differs across countries. Dolton and Bondibene (2011) mention that the use of
weighted regression might be a solution to this problem. The regression should be weighted by
the number of raw data points that are used to calculate the averages.5 As a robustness check we
add, therefore, estimates of regressions weighted by the sizes of the labor markets, measured as
the number of persons aged 15 to 64.
To additionally test the robustness of our results regarding changes in the wage structure
we estimate our model with an alternative Kaitz index, the ratio of the minimum wage to the
median wage. If changes in the Kaitz index are mainly driven by changes in the wage structure,
the estimates should differ for both models. If changes in the wage structure have only a small
influence on the Kaitz index, the results should be the same.
4 Empirical Findings
In this section we present the main results of the effects of minimum wages on employment of
the three age groups. In the second subsection we additionally analyze the interaction terms
Anderson, Kunitomo, and Sawa, 1982). Various studies show that the the LIML estimator approaches the
asymptotic normal distribution much more rapidly than two–stage least squares.
2. The LIML estimator is preferred to the 2SLS estimator whenever instruments are weak and the use of the
LIML estimator potentially eliminates the usual bias associated with the use of 2SLS with weak instruments,
even if the normality of the errors is violated (see e.g. Kunitomo and Matsushita, 2008).
5We weight the regressions with raw data points that are used to calculate the average (or the labor market
size), but not with the population of the country (as it is done by Dolton and Bondibene (2011)). This might not
be an appropriate weight, since the population size is not necessarily a good proxy for the labor market size. The
retirement age differs widely across countries and, additionally, the demographic structure in the countries is not
the same.
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with other variables of interest. Finally, the third subsection contains the instrumental variable
specifications and the weighted regressions, by which we test the robustness of our results.
4.1 Main findings for the age groups
Tables 3 and 4 present the main specifications for the age groups, with and without time effects.
Tables 3 and 4 reveal a nonlinear relationship between the minimum wage and the employment
for young and older workers. At lower levels of the minimum wage, the level of employment rises
along with the wage level, and beyond a turning point the relation inverses and additional increases
in the minimum wages have a detrimental effect on employment levels. This result is consistent
with the theory of Brown et al. (2014). Using these estimates, we can calculate the marginal
effects of a change in the minimum wages at each value of the minimum wage for the three age
groups. These results are visualized in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Figure 1: Effects of minimum wages on prediction of employment– young workers
Reservation wage plays an important role in the decision of a job acceptance. If the offered
wage is below the reservation wage, the person decides to stay outside the job market; if it is
above, then the person prefers to participate in the job market and accept the job offer. The
reservation wage is influenced through individual preferences (e.g. work vs. free time, financial
dependence), labor market policies (e.g. unemployment benefits, minimum wage), and outside
options (e.g. higher education, retirement).
Young workers are often not eligible for unemployment benefits, and are likely to tolerate
unemployment6, and have more outside options than prime-age workers (e.g. can stay longer
in education). Moreover, younger workers have higher probability of receiving a job offer than
older workers (Addison, Centeno, and Portugal, 2004). Hence, an increase of the minimum wage
makes employment more attractive as in other age groups. Higher minimum wages increase the
6Cosar (2010): “lower discount rate, which makes them more willing to tolerate unemployment and search for
productive matches.”
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Figure 2: Effects of minimum wages on prediction of employment – prime–aged workers
Figure 3: Effects of minimum wages on prediction of employment – older workers
8
job acceptance probability, resulting in a higher employment. This positive employment effect
is counteracted by the negative job offer effect, as firms facing increased costs for salaries will
be no longer offer low productive jobs. At low levels of minimum wage, the job acceptance effect
dominates the job offer effect resulting in a positive employment effect. We find that for the young
age group the turning point is attained for the Kaitz index of 0.38. At this threshold level an
additional increase of the Kaitz index decreases employment. The marginal effect of a change in
the minimum wage is visualized in Figure 1 and the respective values of the marginal effects can
be found in Table 9 in the Appendix.
Older workers at the end of their working life have retirement as an outside option, i.e. they
can decide between remaining in the job market or retirement. De Coen, Forrier, and Sels (2013)
find that older workers set higher reservation wages when they move closer towards the retirement
age. With higher minimum wage the job market becomes more attractive, and the people are
more willing to postpone retirement. This influences the employment in this group positively.
Nevertheless, an increase of the minimum wage forces firms to cut the low productive jobs leading
to a decrease in employment. At a threshold level the negative job offer effect overwhelms the
positive job acceptance effect. This turning point for the older workers is attained for the Kaitz
index of about 0.41. The marginal effect of a change in the minimum wage is visualized in Figure
3 and the respective values of the marginal effects can be found in Table 10 in the Appendix.
For the group of prime age workers the marginal effects are not significantly different from
zero.7 As prime age workers have constrained outside options (might be too early for retirement
and/or too late for education), the job acceptance level of this working age group might already by
high. As such, an additional increase of the minimum wage might have only a modest influence,
eliminating the positive effect of job acceptance rate. On the other hand, the negative job offer
effect is not eliminated. Hence, an increase of the minimum wage influences the employment of
prime age workers negatively. The linear effects are highlighted in Table 11 (in the Appendix).
Comparison of the employment effects for the group of young and older workers suggests that
younger workers are more strongly affected by the increases in the minimum wage and the balance
between the job acceptance and job offers is shifted to the left. Following De Coen et al. (2013),
older workers have a higher reservation wage, and thus increases at the lower levels of minimum
wage affect only the job acceptance behavior of young workers, which yields that the positive
employment effects should be higher than for the older workers. On the other hand, as argued
by Addison et al. (2004), as young workers have a higher probability of receiving a job offer, the
negative job offer effect affects this group more heavily and cancels the positive job acceptance
effect more strongly.
4.2 Interaction of the minimum wages with other labor market charac-
teristics
4.2.1 Young workforce
Table 5 presents the results of the interaction between the level of the minimum wage and the
replacement rates, workers’ productivity, and labor market regulations for the young workforce.
Once the interaction with GRR is included, the turning point at which the minimum wage starts
to have a detrimental effect on employment shifts towards the lower level of the minimum wage:
the turning point is attained for the Kaitz index of about 0.36 (marginal effects are presented in
Table 12 in the Appendix). When we include the interaction with AWP, on the other hand, the
turning point shifts to the right to the level of 0.39, as predicted by the theory (see Table 13 in
the Appendix). Interaction with the hiring costs index shifts the turning point to the left, to a
level of 0.36 (marginal effects are presented in Table 14 in the Appendix).
The effect of the replacement rates has the expected negative sign. Productivity of the workers
enters with a positive sign in specification (3), however turns insignificant once the time effects are
included. This result is consistent with the fact that productivity in the analyzed countries has
7The respective marginal effects of a change in the minimum wage for prime-age workers are depicted in Figure
2.
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been constantly rising in the analyzed period. Additional control variables do not seem to affect
the employment levels, except for the conscription index in the case of young workers.
Figure 4: Marginal effects of minimum wages at levels of GRR, AWP, and H – young workers
Marginal effects of the minimum wages for different values of GRR, AWP, and H are pre-
sented in Figure 4. We can observe that the effect of minimum wages for different levels of the
replacement rates remains negative, though not significantly different from zero. On the other
hand, inspection of Figure 4 reveals that the negative effect of the minimum wages is particularly
important when the average workers’ productivity is low, whereas once the productivity increases
the effect disappears. This empirical finding is again consistent with the theoretical prediction
about the role of productivity on the job offers. From (1) it follows that when a is high compared
to the equilibrium wage, job offers might not be disappearing so easily. Finally, Figure 4 reveals
that the negative effect of the minimum wages on employment is particularly relevant whenever
the job market is strongly regulated, a result which is consistent with our theoretical model but is
not in line with the findings of Neumark and Wascher (2004). When the overall regulation level
is low, the additional effect of the minimum wage in fact turns positive.
In what follows, we shall concentrate on the effects for the young workers only, as only these
groups, as suggested by the results in Table 3 are significantly affected by the minimum wages.
Many countries have subminimum wages for young workers in place, but these are not included
in our analysis. The subminimum wages differ broadly across the age groups and also in size
within the age groups. While most countries introduce subminimum wages for workers younger
than nineteen, others include workers under the age of 23. Moreover, the level of reduction in the
minimum wage for younger workers differs across countries. Therefore, a serious analysis of the
effects in a cross–country set–up is very difficult.
In Figures 5 and 6 we compare the predicted turning points for the young workforce with the
actual Kaitz index values for European countries, taking into account the joint effect of the mini-
mum wage and other labor market characteristics. For the values of the hiring costs, replacement
rates, and workers’ productivity we estimate the effects. The differences in the turning points for
the countries stem therefore from the impacts of the hiring costs, the workers’ productivity, and
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the replacement rates. The increase of the turning point over time is mainly due to the increase in
productivity. Still, the southern European countries do not follow the upward trend of the turning
points.
Figure 5: Turning points and actual Kaitz index for young workers (aged 15 to 24 years) I
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In two of the countries in our sample, France and Greece, the minimum wages are at a level
higher than the turning point. In these cases decreasing the minimum wage is expected to increase
the employment levels of young workers. As the driving forces of these results, we can identify
high replacement rates and strict job market regulations for the case of France and very low
productivity levels and strict job market regulations in Greece. In other countries, either because
of high productivity of the workers (e.g. in Belgium and the Netherlands), low replacement rates
(e.g. in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland), or otherwise deregulated job markets (e.g. in
the United Kingdom and Ireland), the turning points are to the right of the actual Kaitz indices,
and employment for the young workers could be even be further stimulated with an increase in the
minimum wage. However, it is important to notice that for Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain, the actual Kaitz index is very close to the turning point, suggesting that a further
increase in the minimum wage could already reduce the employment rates of the young workforce.
4.3 Robustness analysis
As mentioned in Section 3, one of the main methodological concerns in the analysis of employment
effects of minimum wages, is the potential endogeneity of the minimum wages. Another issue
concerns the use of weighted regressions to account for the sizes of the labor markets. In this
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Figure 6: Turning points and actual Kaitz index for young workers (aged 15 to 24 years) II
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section, therefore, we compare the main results which those of the IV approach, in which we
instrument the minimum wages with the index of left orientation of the cabinets as well as to the
weighted regression approach. Finally, we also check whether our results remain the same when
we use the alternative specification of the Kaitz index, namely the ratio of the minimum wage to
the median wage. In Table 26 (in the Appendix) we show the results of the main estimations,
keeping everything else equal to the main specification, only with the variables lagMWAW and
lagMWAW2 instrumented with the left orientation of the cabinet. Results suggest that the
main results for the young workforce do not differ much from the IV results, however the effect
disappears for the older workers.
The next robustness check stems from weighting the countries by the sizes of their respective
labor markets. The size of the labor market is the number of persons of working age, thus aged
15 to 64. The results are presented in Table 27 in the Appendix. We find that weighting the
regressions does not change the main conclusions. The nonlinearity of the effect of the minimum
wage remains visible, although at slightly lower significance levels. Interestingly, the results of
the weighted regressions suggest that the effect of collective bargaining on the employment is
significant: it induces young employment and reduces older workforce participation. Collective
bargaining arrangements can in fact reduce employment rates of the older labor force, by forcing
the industries to employ them at rates higher than otherwise stemming from their qualifications
and equilibrium wages. Strict labor market regulations, on the other hand, induce higher em-
ployment levels for the older workers. The effect here can be most probably linked to reduced
possibilities of firing. In any case, these interesting preliminary observations require further study.
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A final robustness check consist of using an alternative variant of the Kaitz index, that is the
ration of the minimum wage to the median wage. The main result for the young workforce is
robust to this change.
5 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper was to estimate the sensitivity of employment to changes in minimum wages
not only for young workers, but also for other age groups. Additionally, the paper was inspired
by the theoretical model of Brown et al. (2014), which suggests that the employment effects of a
minimum wage are positive if the minimum wage is sufficiently low.
Our results contribute to the discussion of the effects of minimum wages on employment, which
have been reported in previous studies to have a detrimental effect, in particular for the young
workforce. The presented results suggest that low levels of minimum wage have in fact a positive
effect, as they stimulate job acceptance rates. On the other hand, high minimum wages decrease
the demand for labor and destroy employment possibilities.
Moreover, we show that the minimum wage effect is conditional on other labor markets’ char-
acteristics, in particular on the levels of unemployment benefits and labor market regulations.
Detrimental effects of high minimum wages are particularly strong if accompanied by high un-
employment benefits and/or comparatively strict labor market regulations. Weighted regressions
have additionally revealed that the collective bargaining processes and strictness of labor market
regulations might have different effects for different age groups. This preliminary result will be
further addressed in subsequent research.
Using these results, we are able to show that some European countries in our sample might in
fact contribute to unemployment rates of young individuals by setting too high levels of minimum
wages, as is the case in France and Greece. However, for Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain, the actual Kaitz index is very close to the turning point suggesting that a further
increase in the minimum wage could already reduce the employment rates of the young workforce.
On the other hand, in countries which either have relatively deregulated job markets and/or
highly productive workers (e.g. the United Kingdom), higher minimum wages should not have a
detrimental effect on employment. As a general recommendation, it can be concluded that policy
makers should formulate the minimum wage policy in accordance with local circumstances, and
in particular closely considering the characteristics of the local labor markets.
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Table 1: Predicted effects
Variable Sign/Effect
Minimum Wage Inverted U
Hiring Costs Negative
Productivity Positive
Unemployment benefits Negative
Hiring Costs * Minimum Wage Negative (Shift left)
Productivity * Minimum Wage Positive (Shift right)
Unemployment Benefits * Minimum Wage Negative (Shift left)
Table 2: Cross-correlations of the instruments (Significance at 0.05 level)
Variables Unemployment Output gap
Output Gap -0.41*
Oil shock -0.14* 0.18*
Table 3: Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpM EmpM EmpO EmpO
lagMWAW 2.48∗ 2.70∗∗ 0.26 0.46 0.02 1.23∗∗∗
(1.82) (2.13) (0.40) (1.24) (0.02) (3.97)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -3.53∗∗ -3.73∗∗ -0.77 -0.81 -0.05 -1.51∗∗∗
(-2.04) (-2.31) (-0.91) (-1.64) (-0.05) (-4.64)
AWP -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00
(-5.97) (-4.30) (0.92) (-5.47) (0.21) (-0.01)
GRR -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗
(-5.85) (-5.95) (-3.92) (-4.99) (-2.25) (-1.93)
Hiring Cost 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.63) (-1.62) (-0.15) (-2.58) (-3.73)
Unemployment -1.21∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗
(-7.26) (-6.64) (-10.18) (-12.39) (-2.97) (-2.79)
Conscription 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.40) (0.28) (1.45) (0.54) (0.20) (-0.89)
Collective Bargaining 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.93) (0.86) (-0.49) (-0.82) (-1.73) (-2.44)
PRY 0.17 0.11
(0.45) (0.26)
PRM 0.35∗∗∗ 0.14∗
(2.77) (1.92)
PRO 1.32∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗
(2.69) (2.21)
Constant 0.12 0.06 0.59∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.26 0.18∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.34) (3.96) (7.24) (1.54) (3.33)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 198.70 196.4 190.65 192.67 191.36 194.95
Hansen J p-val 0.65 0.89 0.12 0.29 0.04 0.08
Robust clustered SE, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
14
Table 4: Main results with oil shock exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpM EmpM EmpO EmpO
lagMWAW 3.17∗∗ 3.17∗∗ 0.72 0.60 -0.68 0.88∗∗
(2.02) (1.99) (0.93) (1.34) (-0.51) (1.97)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -4.19∗∗ -4.08∗∗ -1.21 -0.90 0.67 -1.25∗∗
(-2.19) (-2.12) (-1.24) (-1.53) (0.48) (-2.50)
AWP -0.04∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗
(-2.28) (-2.81) (4.07) (-2.40) (0.16) (1.92)
GRR -0.07∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.02∗
(-7.89) (-8.82) (-3.18) (-9.81) (-1.72) (-1.80)
Hiring Cost 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.04∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(1.37) (0.85) (-0.43) (0.77) (-1.82) (-5.11)
Unemployment -1.38∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.73∗∗∗
(-5.92) (-3.72) (-11.98) (-9.79) (-3.54) (-5.27)
Conscription 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.24) (-0.25) (1.12) (0.47) (-0.28) (-1.48)
Collective Bargaining 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01∗
(0.50) (0.69) (-0.60) (-0.68) (-0.66) (-1.78)
PRY 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.06)
PRM 0.18 0.15∗
(1.19) (1.81)
PRO 1.46∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(2.70) (5.73)
Constant 0.02 -0.02 0.60∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.38 0.22∗∗∗
(0.06) (-0.07) (2.78) (5.25) (1.37) (2.60)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 216 216 216 216 216 216
K-P Wald F 2.28 2.25 2.28 2.26 2.30 2.26
Robust clustered SE, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5: Young workers – interactions
(1) (2) (3)
EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 2.62∗∗∗ 2.69∗ 2.10∗∗
(3.00) (1.92) (2.00)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -3.48∗∗∗ -3.72∗∗ -3.08∗∗
(-3.38) (-2.10) (-2.21)
lagMWAW × Hiring Cost -0.45∗∗∗
(-3.76)
lagMWAW × GRR -0.00
(-0.02)
lagMWAW × AWP 0.32∗
(1.81)
Hiring Cost 0.20∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02
(3.63) (0.49) (0.98)
GRR -0.05∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.07∗∗∗
(-2.84) (-1.09) (-4.56)
AWP -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(-4.44) (-4.19) (-2.50)
Unemployment -1.10∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗
(-9.92) (-6.56) (-7.12)
Conscription 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.84) (0.27) (0.26)
Collective Bargaining 0.03∗∗ 0.01 0.01
(2.21) (0.86) (0.69)
PRY -0.10 0.11 -0.19
(-0.37) (0.26) (-0.46)
Constant 0.14 0.07 0.27∗
(0.92) (0.28) (1.65)
FE YES YES YES
Time effects YES YES YES
N 228 228 228
K-P Wald 192.94 185.27 189.47
Hansen J p-val 0.40 0.59 0.49
Robust clustered SE, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the Kaitz index defined as MinWage/AvWage (first line) and
MinWage/MedianWage (second line)
Country Mean SD Min Max Range
Belgium 0.465 0.022 0.430 0.495 0.065
(1983) 0.539 0.025 0.498 0.572 0.074
Czech Republic 0.284 0.045 0.197 0.339 0.142
(1993) 0.329 0.058 0.218 0.398 0.180
Estonia 0.300 0.028 0.258 0.344 0.086
(1999) 0.368 0.032 0.320 0.413 0.093
France 0.388 0.073 0.252 0.485 0.233
(1983) 0.483 0.090 0.323 0.608 0.285
Greece 0.471 0.115 0.308 0.707 0.399
(1983) 0.610 0.128 0.441 0.851 0.410
Hungary 0.342 0.036 0.281 0.425 0.144
(1992) 0.439 0.058 0.365 0.570 0.205
Ireland 0.453 0.042 0.432 0.585 0.153
(2000) 0.527 0.051 0.476 0.675 0.199
Netherlands 0.530 0.079 0.413 0.686 0.273
(1971) 0.582 0.076 0.470 0.702 0.232
Poland 0.338 0.080 0.082 0.435 0.353
(1992) 0.407 0.093 0.097 0.478 0.381
Portugal 0.385 0.033 0.340 0.497 0.157
(1975) 0.545 0.045 0.480 0.700 0.220
Slovakia 0.349 0.047 0.265 0.481 0.216
(1994) 0.433 0.058 0.325 0.588 0.263
Slowenia 0.432 0.026 0.401 0.472 0.071
(2005) 0.521 0.038 0.485 0.582 0.097
Spain 0.424 0.089 0.325 0.626 0.301
(1972) 0.533 0.111 0.412 0.785 0.373
United Kingdom 0.363 0.018 0.331 0.382 0.051
(1999) 0.441 0.023 0.402 0.467 0.065
Total 0.414 0.098 0.082 0.707 0.625
0.507 0.111 0.097 0.851 0.754
Table 7: Description of the variables
PRY Cohort size aged 15–24 (OECD)
PRM Cohort size aged 25–54 (OECD)
PRO Cohort size 55–64 (OECD)
Unemp Unemployment rate as defined by ILO (WEO)
Output gap Output gap in percent of potential GDP (WEO)
Oil Price Crude oil import prices (IEA)
GRR Gross replacement rates (OECD)
AWP GDP per hours worked, constant prices (OECD)
H Labor market regulations EFW B (higher value - more regulation)
Conscription World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service,
EFW Index
Bargaining Global Competitiveness Report question: Wages in your country are set by a
centralized bargaining process (= 1) or up to each individual company (= 7)
Left2 Relative power position of social democratic and other left parties in government
based on their seat share in parliament (CPDS I and III)
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Table 9: Young workers – Marginal effects of lagMWAW
0.35 at 0.22
(0.93)
0.36 at 0.13
(0.60)
0.37 at 0.04
(0.20)
0.38 at -0.05
(-0.26)
0.39 at -0.14
(-0.74)
0.40 at -0.23
(-1.21)
N 228
Table 10: Older workers – Marginal effects of lagMWAW
0.39 at 0.06
(0.55)
0.40 at 0.03
(0.34)
0.41 at 0.00
(0.09)
0.42 at -0.01
(-0.20)
0.43 at -0.04
(-0.53)
0.44 at -0.07
(-0.90)
N 216
Table 11: Prime-age workers – Linear Specification
(1) (2)
EmpM EmpM
b/t b/t
lagMWAW -0.39∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(-3.81) (-4.03)
AWP 0.01 -0.03∗∗∗
(0.91) (-6.60)
Hiring Cost 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01
(2.92) (0.96)
GRR -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-4.24) (-6.26)
Unemployment -0.76∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗
(-9.79) (-11.84)
Conscription 0.00 0.00
(0.98) (0.44)
Collective Bargaining -0.00 -0.00
(-0.74) (-1.23)
PRM 0.34∗∗∗ 0.14∗
(2.58) (1.77)
Constant 0.73∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(7.54) (15.37)
FE YES YES
Time effects NO YES
N 228 228
K-P Wald F 187.79 232.44
Hansen J p-val 0.13 0.03
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Table 12: Young workers – Marginal effects of lagMWAW with GRR
(1)
0.34 at 0.23
(0.55)
0.35 at 0.15
(0.38)
0.36 at 0.07
(0.19)
0.37 at -0.01
(-0.04)
0.38 at -0.09
(-0.30)
0.39 at -0.17
(-0.60)
N 216
Table 13: Young workers – Marginal effects of lagMWAW with AWP
(1)
0.37 at 0.22
(1.30)
0.38 at 0.14
(0.86)
0.39 at 0.06
(0.39)
0.40 at -0.01
(-0.08)
0.41 at -0.09
(-0.52)
0.42 at -0.17
(-0.93)
N 216
Table 14: Young workers – Marginal effects of lagMWAW with H
(1)
0.34 at 0.15
(0.94)
0.35 at 0.09
(0.60)
0.36 at 0.03
(0.24)
0.37 at -0.01
(-0.11)
0.38 at -0.07
(-0.44)
0.39 at -0.13
(-0.73)
N 216
Table 15: Belgium
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.61 1.00
(0.00)
MWAW 0.48 -0.44 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Left2 -0.52 0.35 -0.21 1.00
(0.00) (0.05) (0.25)
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Figure 7: The Kaitz index (MWAW) I
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Figure 8: The Kaitz index (MWAW) II
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Table 16: Czech Republic
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.91 1.00
(0.00)
MWAW 0.09 -0.34 1.00
(0.77) (0.26)
Left2 -0.01 0.09 -0.70 1.00
(0.98) (0.73) (0.01)
Table 17: Estonia
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.63 1.00
(0.00)
MWAW 0.60 -0.38 1.00
(0.03) (0.20)
Left2 -0.83 0.55 -0.44 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.13)
Table 18: France
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.48 1.00
(0.01)
MWAW -0.07 0.06 1.00
(0.72) (0.73)
Left2 0.08 0.34 -0.38 1.00
(0.68) (0.06) (0.03)
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Table 19: Greece
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.21 1.00
(0.26)
MWAW -0.57 -0.55 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Left2 0.34 -0.72 0.28 1.00
(0.06) (0.00) (0.12)
Table 20: Ireland
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.51 1.00
(0.00)
MWAW -0.26 0.18 1.00
(0.41) (0.58)
Left2 0.26 -0.65 -0.14 1.00
(0.15) (0.00) (0.67)
Table 21: Netherlands
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.47 1.00
(0.01)
MWAW 0.57 -0.19 1.00
(0.00) (0.29)
Left2 -0.34 0.10 -0.30 1.00
(0.06) (0.60) (0.09)
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Table 22: Portugal
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.46 1.00
(0.01)
MWAW 0.54 -0.19 1.00
(0.00) (0.31)
Left2 0.05 0.01 -0.56 1.00
(0.80) (0.97) (0.00)
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Table 23: Slovakia
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.84 1.00
(0.00)
MWAW 0.28 -0.29 1.00
(0.25) (0.25)
Left2 -0.52 0.57 -0.08 1.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.73)
Table 24: Spain
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.74 1.00
(0.00)
MWAW 0.86 -0.43 1.00
(0.01) (0.33)
Left2 -0.44 0.38 -0.05 1.00
(0.06) (0.13) (0.92)
Table 25: United Kingdom
Variables Unemp Output Gap MWAW Left2
Unemp 1.00
Output Gap -0.59 1.00
(0.00)
MWAW 0.12 -0.46 1.00
(0.53) (0.01)
Left2 0.29 0.06 0.11 1.00
(0.11) (0.75) (0.56)
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Table 26: IV estimations: Kaitz Index instrumented with the left orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpM EmpM EmpO EmpO
lagMWAW 3.37∗∗ 3.04∗∗ 0.46 0.86∗ -0.41 -0.77
(2.49) (2.37) (0.72) (1.75) (-0.73) (-1.34)
lagMWAW× lagMWAW -4.44∗∗∗ -4.15∗∗∗ -1.06 -1.39∗∗ 0.62 0.88
(-2.67) (-2.59) (-1.27) (-2.16) (0.96) (1.48)
AWP -0.07 -0.07∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.03 0.00
(-1.15) (-1.82) (-0.43) (-4.73) (0.61) (0.02)
Hiring Cost 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.04
(0.54) (0.91) (0.18) (0.02) (-1.41) (-1.07)
GRR -0.05 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.08∗ -0.08
(-0.73) (-0.05) (0.03) (-1.58) (-1.89) (-1.34)
Unemployment -1.41∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.82 -0.61∗∗∗ -0.72
(-5.58) (-2.10) (-6.54) (-0.44) (-3.93) (-1.11)
Conscription 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.05
(0.46) (0.76) (0.68) (0.16) (-0.38) (-0.61)
Collective Bargaining 0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08
(0.56) (0.90) (0.18) (-0.46) (-1.03) (-0.78)
PRY -0.88 -1.58
(-0.89) (-0.49)
PRM 0.69 0.79
(1.20) (0.09)
PRO 1.09∗ 0.69
(1.86) (0.24)
Constant -0.51 -1.36 0.92 0.66∗∗ 0.74 -0.01
(-0.51) (-0.93) (1.28) (2.21) (0.81) (-0.00)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 228 228 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 694.37 779.68 590.51 940.76 490.55 867.66
Hansen J p-val 0.80 0.84 0.37 0.27 0.21 0.26
Robust clustered SE, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 27: Weighted estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpM EmpM EmpO EmpO
lagMWAW 2.45 ∗∗∗ 2.59 ∗∗∗ 0.81 0.58 -0.08 1.44∗∗∗
(4.70) (2.58) (1.22) (1.41) (-0.10) (4.50)
lagMWAW × lagMWAW -3.51∗∗ -3.67∗ -1.26 -1.01∗ 0.23 -1.65∗∗∗
(-2.34) (-1.80) (-1.57) (-1.93) (0.28) (-4.34)
AWP -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03
(-6.11) (-3.54) (2.76) (-5.83) (-0.72) (-1.37)
Hiring Cost -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗∗
(-0.48) (-0.69) (-1.28) (-0.57) (-2.24) (-2.23)
GRR -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.03∗∗
(-3.12) (-2.60) (-3.80) (-3.03) (-2.54) (-2.07)
Unemployment -1.08∗∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.27∗∗
(-10.28) (-8.27) (-17.72) (-15.49) (-2.43) (-1.98)
Conscription -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00
(-0.42) (-0.40) (0.16) (0.98) (0.90) (-0.63)
Collective Bargaining 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.02∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(2.49) (2.33) (-0.53) (-0.73) (-2.28) (-3.00)
PRY 0.27 0.00
(1.06) (0.01)
PRM 0.41∗∗ 0.12
(2.53) (1.55)
PRO 1.32∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗
(3.23) (2.52)
Constant 0.05 0.04 0.41∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.25 0.12
(0.21) (0.14) (2.36) (7.02) (1.63) (1.34)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 228 228 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 59.90 92.16 387.49 196.07 123.67 69.05
Hansen J p-val 0.54 0.24 0.54 0.38 0.76 0.27
Robust clustered SE, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 28: Estimations with Minimum Wage to Median Wage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpM EmpM EmpO EmpO
lagMWMW 1.37∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ -0.10 0.19 1.44∗ 1.30∗
(2.78) (3.98) (-0.28) (0.63) (1.91) (1.65)
lagMWMW × lagMWMW -1.27∗ -1.11 0.04 -0.23 -1.37∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗
(-1.80) (-1.50) (0.11) (-0.80) (-2.97) (-4.23)
AWP -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.01
(-3.49) (-3.08) (2.34) (-4.42) (0.33) (-0.39)
GRR -0.09∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-4.62) (-5.54) (-2.41) (-4.02) (-1.98) (-3.15)
Hiring Cost -0.02 -0.02 -0.02∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-1.13) (-0.84) (-2.13) (-0.87) (-2.72) (-4.07)
Unemployment -1.25∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗
(-6.52) (-6.75) (-8.99) (-11.91) (-3.42) (-3.31)
Conscription -0.03∗ -0.03∗ -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(-1.70) (-1.69) (-0.94) (-0.86) (-0.02) (-1.34)
Collective Bargaining -0.01 -0.01 -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(-0.87) (-0.86) (-2.38) (-2.97) (-2.07) (-2.89)
PRY -0.65 -0.66
(-0.95) (-1.02)
PRM 0.56∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(3.87) (2.76)
PRO 1.37∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(2.78) (3.00)
Constant 0.38 0.26 0.53∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.09
(1.34) (1.02) (2.36) (7.10) (0.04) (-0.67)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 228 228 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 1691.41 1842.31 1700.58 1710.74 1671.06 1605.14
Hansen J p-val 0.26 0.22 0.47 0.16 0.07 0.13
Robust clustered SE, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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